By Nasser Qindeel
Giving a brief account of a debate conductedby a group of Israeli researchers and analysts, who have been trying to figure out what potential changes might take place on the Syrian landscape in order to chart a new strategy to meet with the unfolding transformations in the wake of the defeat sustained by Armed groups in Aleppo battle, the Israeli strategic analyst Ben Kasbit explicitly admitted that “Israel” was defeated, lost the bet and missed the opportunity.
In a piece he wrote to the famous “The Monitor” website in 2017, Kasbit quoted an anonymous Israeli security source as saying: “It is high time for “Israel” to admit that it has failed in adequately assessing the situation in Syria.” Five years ago, Tel Aviv was “damned sure” that Syria will never rise up again to what it has been before the war. But it seems that this “prediction” was damned wrong. Today, it is obviously clear that Syria is recovering and will rise up again even stronger. The developments on the ground indicate that President Assad will soon declare victory and open the way for Syria’s imminent rebuilding and reconstruction.”
Almost all Israeli military and intelligence analysts regret missing what they consider the “chance” of dealing a lethal blow to Syria and the Syrian President at the climax of a critical juncture, when battles were fiercely fought in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace or when a “security belt” was established in the territories adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights.
The Israeli affairs analyst deemed it most likely that once the war is over, a new Syria will be born and this new Syria will be yet more “dangerous” than ever before. According to this security source,Syria’s renewed vigor is stemmed from its connections with Iraq and Iran, who in turn maintain close links with the Lebanese Hizbollah Party. This isroughly the Israeli assessment of the situation, on basis of which it devises its policies and prepares itself for the would-be forthcoming developments.
Over the entire period spanning the time between the liberation of Aleppo and the moment in which the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) would get up to the disengagement line along the occupied Golan Heights, Israel has been trying to dictate certain rules of engagement so that it might meet the post-decisive-Syrian-victory challenges. Hence it fought a “war of wills” against Syria and allies. A year ago, Syria enforced the sanctity of her air space barring, thereby, Israeli air forces from violating it. Shortly later, Syria enforced new rules of engagement making it crystal clear that no Israeli act of aggression would go without a reprisal, including the right to hit hard deep (into the occupation entity), as was the case in the recent encounter known as the “long night of missiles” fired across the two sides of the Golan Heights. Alongside this encounter, an equally fierce intelligence warfare was going on. This latter warfare took the form of messages being indirectly exchanged through the Russian mediator.
A ceasefire was agreed when Syria sent her last message, in which she warned to hit strategic facilities deep into the occupation entity should “Israel” target any sovereign positions in the Syrian capital Damascus.
The attempts to portray defeat as some sort of a victory is reminiscent of 2000. Back then, Israel tried to sell the story that its withdrawal from southern Lebanon was not a victory for the Resistance, but merely an implementation of the UN resolution passed 18 years earlier. For long 18 years, Israel has not only totally overlooked the UN resolution demanding it to withdraw, but has also been trying to establish a “security belt” by deploying its stooges and local Lebanese proxies on the Lebanese territories.
Israel today faces a similar situation. Only now it remembers the existence of a disengagement agreement. This agreement, which it has been treading upon for years now, suddenly remembers something called “the disengagement agreement”. For years, it has been violating this agreement, in the hope of partitioning Syria and grabbing a chunk of her land under the disguise of a “security belt”, not shying away from explicitly stating that it would trust al-Qaeda to guard it.
But things would not go back to 2011. That is why Israel is worried. It fears that any potential reactivation of the 1974 disengagement agreement might entail a call for the implementation of other relevant UN resolutions, including those demanding Israel to withdraw from the Syrian Golan Heights. That is why Israel is also worried from the reviving military capabilities of the Syrian Arab Army and its air defenses. That is why Israel is worried of the considerable military and strategic complementarity maintained between the Syrian Army and the rest of forces of the resistance axis.
What is sure is that Syria’s victory would have ripple effect on the entire geo-strategic situation in the region. The first one to be impacted is “Israel”.
Syria’s victory is a victory for all resistance forces and media games can not turn the defeat into a victory.
Translated into English by Syrianfacts. The original article was published in Arabic by the Lebanese Al-Binaa Newspaper